Revision of the GBER

Revision of the GBER - SAH Blog26 GBERd

Block exemption of new financial instruments.

 

Introduction
 
The Commission has recently published a proposal for amendment of Council Regulation 2015/1588[1] which authorises the Commission to adopt block exemption regulations. The purpose of the Commission’s proposal is to expand Article 1 of Regulation 2015/1588. This Article lists the categories of aid that may be declared compatible with the internal market.The Commission wants the following to be added to that list:

  1. “financing channelled through or supported by EU centrally-managed financial instruments or budgetary guarantees, where the aid consists in the form of additional funding provided through State resources”, and
  2. “projects supported by EU European Territorial Cooperation programmes”.

After the proposal is adopted, the scope of the GBER will be widened to include additional categories of aid covering projects that are partly financed by EU funds managed at EU level. Unlike the current co-financing of Member State projects by EU structural and investment funds (ESIF) which are considered to be state resource because they are channelled through national authorities, the new rules will apply to national money that will accompany financing that is granted directly by an EU body. This is unusual and, therefore, it is worth understanding the Commission’s motivation.

 

The purpose of the revision

The proposal comes with an explanatory memorandum. In its own words, the aim of the revision is to “improve the interplay of […] EU funding programmes with State aid rules. It will enable the Commission to make targeted modifications of current State aid rules so that national money – including from the European Structural and Investment Funds managed at national level – and EU funds managed centrally by the Commission can be combined as seamlessly as possible, without distorting competition in the EU’s Single market.”

The memorandum also reiterates that “EU funds managed centrally by the Commission that are not subject to any discretion by Member States (such as COSME, Horizon Europe or the Digital Europe Programme), are not State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).”

However, the memorandum also points out that “where Member States provide additional national funding to a project, a financial instrument supported by a centrally managed EU fund or contribute resources over which they retain a certain degree of discretion to a centrally managed fund, State aid rules apply to the part of the funding under discretion by a Member State.”

“Similarly, Member States have greater control over EU money under shared management, as is the case for the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) as well as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). This type of funding therefore represents State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and is subject to State aid control.”

Despite these well-known differences in the legal status of EU money directly paid to final beneficiaries and EU money indirectly paid via national authorities, the reality is that at national or regional level there is often no appreciation of the fact that EU money is not automatically excluded from State aid rules, nor does it automatically count as State aid. There is confusion because EU money falls within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU only if a public authority can exercise control over it.

As a consequence, the Commission goes on to observe that “the right articulation between EU funds rules and State aid rules is important to guarantee the best possible impact of the MFF and to avoid unnecessary complexities. This is especially important for situations in which a project is funded both by EU funds managed centrally by the Commission as well as by funds under the control of Member States.”

Therefore, “to simplify the treatment of such situations for Member States, financial intermediaries and project developers EU funds rules and State aid rules should be consistent.”

(In my opinion it would have been legally and administratively simpler to exclude from the scope of State aid rules, rather than block exempt, projects co-financed by funds managed directly at EU level. This is because the EU institution responsible for managing the funds would ensure that the whole public support (by the EU and Member State) would be compatible with the internal market.)


Do you know we also publish a journal on State aid?

EStAL banner

The European State Aid Law Quarterly is available online and in print, and our subscribers benefit from a reduced price for our events.


 

The targets of the amendments

The proposal identifies “three areas in which modifications of the GBER could improve the interplay of EU funding programmes with State aid rules.”

(a) National financing combined with instruments from the new InvestEU Fund

The Commission has also proposed the establishment of a new “InvestEU Fund”. The relevant document (COM(2018)439) explains that “the InvestEU Programme’s actions should be used to address market failures or sub-optimal investment situations, in a proportionate manner, without duplicating or crowding out private financing and have a clear European added value. This will ensure consistency between the actions of the Programme and EU State aid rules, avoiding undue distortions of competition in the internal market.”

It should be mentioned, however, that that document contains no other reference to State aid. This is not surprising because the funding will be controlled at EU level. What the Commission really wants to do is to ensure consistency in EU and national funding for the same projects.

Indeed, the Commission proposal for the modification of the GBER reveals that consistency is what the Commission has in mind. “The relevant State aid requirements could be laid down in the GBER, to accompany an InvestEU Fund Regulation and the InvestEU Fund’s Investment Guidelines that contains the necessary safeguards. Such a modification of the GBER could exempt Member State money that is channelled through the InvestEU Fund or supported by the InvestEU Fund from prior notification to the Commission under State aid rules, thereby ensuring a streamlined and efficient implementation of the InvestEU Fund.”

(b) Research, development and innovation

The Commission has also presented its ideas for “Horizon Europe”. RDI projects evaluated and selected in line with the rules applicable to Horizon Europe and jointly funded by Horizon Europe and Member States (including from structural funds), where at least three Member States participate, “could be allowed to be implemented without an additional State aid assessment for the Member States’ part of the funding. This would be possible because the rules for projects to qualify for support from Horizon Europe remove any competition concerns, in particular by requiring projects to meet common EU interest objectives and to address well-defined market failures.”

(c) European Territorial Cooperation

Under the current State aid rules, ETC projects can be supported through national public money. Aid to SMEs for costs incurred in ETC projects is already covered by the GBER. The Commission proposal mentions that the “the Commission has gained significant experience in relation to aid measures aimed at the promotion of ETC projects. A further extension of the scope of aid measures allowed under the GBER could therefore be considered.”

 

Conclusions

It is fair to infer that this revision of Regulation 2015/1588 and the consequent amendment of the GBER will not change anything substantive. However, it will contribute to administrative simplification. Projects and funding approved by the Commission on the basis of other rules, which also aim to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, will not be subject to additional checks under State aid rules. This makes sense and their block-exemption should be welcome.

——————————————————————————————

[1] The full text of the proposal can be accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/enabling_regulation_targeted_amendment_en.pdf.

Tags

Über

Phedon Nicolaides

Dr. Nicolaides was educated in the United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. He has a PhD in Economics and a PhD in Law. He is professor at the University of Maastricht and the University of Nicosia. He has published extensively on European integration, competition policy and State aid. He is also on the editorial boards of several journals. Dr. Nicolaides has organised seminars and workshops in many different Member States, and has acted as consultant to several public authorities.

Hinterlasse eine Antwort

Zusammenhängende Posts

16. Okt 2024
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
European Court of Auditors, Report on the Implementation of the EU Budget for the 2023 Financial Year, 10 October 2024 - State Aid Uncovered photos 10

European Court of Auditors, Report on the Implementation of the EU Budget for the 2023 Financial Year, 10 October 2024

The annual report on the 2023 EU budget by the European Court of Auditors finds that in the field of State aid national authorities wrongly supported ineligible costs. Errors in public procurement and State aid were the largest source of irregularities. Main findings concerning public procurement and State aid “The risk of error is high for expenditure subject to complex […]
26. Apr 2022
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
Member States Must Recover of their Own Initiative Illegally Granted Aid - State Aid Uncovered SM posts 3

Member States Must Recover of their Own Initiative Illegally Granted Aid

Aid granted illegal must be recovered by the granting authority without any need for a prior Commission decision ordering recovery. The amount of recovered aid may be limited to that which is in excess of what is allowed by the GBER. Introduction It is a well-established principle in the case law that a “prudent market operator” is responsible to check […]
06. Okt 2020
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
Member States Beware: Compliance with the GBER and the SME Criteria has just Become more Difficult - doors 1767564 1920

Member States Beware: Compliance with the GBER and the SME Criteria has just Become more Difficult

I am grateful to Péter Staviczky for comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am solely responsible for its contents. The European Commission retains its sole right to assess the compatibility of aid granted on the basis of the GBER. Criteria defined in national law need not be taken into account by the Commission. The SME status has […]
01. Sep 2020
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
Pari Passu Investments - money 3115984 1920

Pari Passu Investments

Update on Temporary Framework: Number of approved and published covid-19 measures, as of 28 August 2020: 270* Legal basis: Article 107(2)(b): 28; Article 107(3)(b): 228; Article 107(3)(c): 21 Four Member States have implemented 15 or more covid-19 measures each: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy & Poland. – Average number of measures per Member State: 9.6 – Median number of measures […]
14. Jul 2020
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
report

2019 Competition Report

The Annual Competition Report is a useful document, but it should provide more information on the results of the ex post evaluations and ex post monitoring. Update on Temporary Framework: Number of approved and published COVID-19 measures, as of 10 July 2020: 202* Legal basis: Article 107(2)(b): 20; Article 107(3)(b): 171; Article 107(3)(c): 17 Six Member States have implemented 11 […]
11. Jun 2020
Guest State Aid Blog von Erika Szyszczak
When State Aid Gets Political - brexit 3870554 1920

When State Aid Gets Political

We are happy to receive a guest comment on the EU – UK post-Brexit trade negotiations from Professor Emerita, Erika Szyszczak, who is a Fellow of UKTPO at the University of Sussex. This is a longer version of an earlier Blog published on the UKTPO website. Control over State aid is a stumbling block for the future of an EU […]
02. Jun 2020
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
euro coins

i) Investor-State Arbitration ii) Recovery of Incompatible State Aid iii) State Aid Scoreboard 2019

Member States abolish bilateral investment treaties between themselves. When the Commission orders recovery of incompatible State aid, interest has to be added to the recoverable amount for the whole period of illegality regardless of any national limitation rules. In 2018, Member States granted EUR 121 billion to industry and services, EUR 6.3 billion to agriculture and EUR 50 billion to […]
14. Mai 2020
Guest State Aid Blog von Wout De Cock
corona virus

Belgium and COVID-19: The European Commission Approves Several Belgian State Aid Measures

We are happy to share with you an update on the Covid-19 measures that have been approved in Belgium. Our guest auhor Wout De Cock is a PhD candidate at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and part-time teaching assistant at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.* Introduction In issue 1/2020 of the European State Aid Law Quarterly, we concluded that the European Commission […]
05. Mai 2020
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
corona virus poster

Non-recovery of Incompatible State aid Is Costly

Legal and practical difficulties in the recovery of incompatible State aid do not constitute justifiable “absolute impossibility”. Temporary Framework On 1 May, the total number of State aid measures to combat covid-19 approved by the European Commission reached 102. Their legal basis was: Article 107(2)(b): 9; Article 107(3)(b): 86; Article 107(3)(c): 7   Introduction The 2020 Temporary Framework for State […]
27. Apr 2020
State Aid Uncovered von Phedon Nicolaides
corona virus poster

Identification of Undertakings in Difficulty

A company is in difficulty if, in practice, its accumulated net losses exceed 50% of its subscribed capital, regardless of whether the subscribed capital is formally written down. The classification of a company as being in difficulty is independent of the sector in which it operates and of whether a private investor would be willing to invest in it. Temporary […]